{"id":74252,"date":"2017-06-05T21:18:19","date_gmt":"2017-06-06T01:18:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/stateofthenation2012.com\/?p=74252"},"modified":"2018-05-31T10:13:36","modified_gmt":"2018-05-31T14:13:36","slug":"did-the-c-i-a-set-up-a-young-patsy-to-disclose-a-fake-nsa-report-on-non-existent-russian-hacking","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/stateofthenation2012.com\/?p=74252","title":{"rendered":"Did the C.I.A. set up a young patsy to disclose a fake NSA report on non-existent Russian hacking?"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

Latest Desperate Attempt By U.S. Intelligence Community To Validate Russia Hack Story Totally Implausible<\/h3>\n

TMR<\/a> Editor’s Note:<\/strong>
\nThe latest attempt by the NSA\/CIA\/FBI \u00a0to discredit President Trump with a fake report on Russian hacking is quite ridiculous and beyond juvenile. \u00a0On the face of it, the whole fictitious story is just one more very desperate attempt to smear Trump victory with Russian interference.<\/p>\n

Yet another engineered fake leak of a fraudulent NSA report by a 25-year-old neophyte \u2014 How stupid do they think we are?!<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Democrats still can’t believe Hillary Clinton lost; nor can John Podesta grasp that he is now known worldwide as the key political player in an elite pedophile network. \u00a0That particular global network is deeply involved in much worse criminal conduct against children than pedophilia incidentally. \u00a0The critical point is that a once powerful political operative like Podesta now has 2 major strikes against him: (i) he lost an easy election to Donald Trump as Hillary’s campaign chairman and (ii) he and his brother Tony got found out for their odious crimes committed against the children. \u00a0These are both driving Democrat mania towards the Trump presidency, among many other larger factors of course.<\/p>\n

Now, with yet another fake report being conveniently leaked right after the recent NBC interview with President Putin, it’s obvious that Deep State<\/em> will do everything in its power to topple Trump with the false “Russian hack” narrative.<\/p>\n

Much more importantly, this latest fraudulent NSA report will be used to bring all U.S. elections under the umbrella of Department of Homeland Security<\/strong> as a security measure. \u00a0In other words, TPTB will invoke “national security’ just as they always do so that the FEDs can rig and\/or hack all future elections (and especially the voting process for POTUS). \u00a0They will never permit another “Donald Trump” again in the Oval Office.<\/p>\n

— \u00a0End of Story \u00a0—<\/p>\n

The Millennium Report<\/a>
\nJune 5, 2017<\/p>\n

N.B. \u00a0Why The Intercept’s<\/strong>\u00a0report below appears to feed into Deep State’s<\/em> hidden agenda is quite perplexing. \u00a0 Hence, reader discretion is highly advised.<\/p>\n

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<\/p>\n

TOP-SECRET NSA REPORT DETAILS RUSSIAN HACKING EFFORT DAYS BEFORE 2016 ELECTION<\/h2>\n
Matthew Cole<\/span>, <\/span>Richard Esposito<\/span>, <\/span>Sam Biddle<\/span>, <\/span>Ryan Grim
\nThe Intercept<\/span><\/div>\n
\n

RUSSIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE<\/u> executed a cyberattack on at least one U.S. voting software supplier and sent spear-phishing emails to more than 100 local election officials just days before last November\u2019s presidential election, according to a highly classified intelligence report obtained by The Intercept.<\/p>\n

The top-secret National Security Agency document, which was provided anonymously to The Intercept and independently authenticated, analyzes intelligence very recently acquired by the agency about a months-long Russian intelligence cyber effort against elements of the U.S. election and voting infrastructure. The report, dated May 5, 2017, is\u00a0the most detailed U.S. government account of Russian interference in the election that has yet come to light.<\/p>\n

While the document provides\u00a0a rare window\u00a0into the NSA\u2019s\u00a0understanding of the mechanics of Russian hacking, it does not show the underlying \u201craw\u201d intelligence on which the analysis is based.\u00a0A U.S. intelligence officer who declined to be identified cautioned against drawing too big a conclusion from the document\u00a0because a single analysis is not necessarily definitive.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

\n
\u00a0NSA Report on Russia Spearphishing –\u00a0<\/span>5 pages<\/span><\/h6>\n<\/div>\n
\n

The report indicates that Russian hacking may have penetrated further into U.S. voting systems than was previously understood. It\u00a0states unequivocally in its summary statement that it was Russian military intelligence, specifically the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate, or GRU, that conducted\u00a0the cyber attacks described in the document:<\/p>\n

Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate actors \u2026 executed cyber espionage operations against a named U.S. company in August 2016, evidently to obtain information on elections-related software and hardware solutions. \u2026 The actors likely used data obtained from that operation to \u2026 launch a voter registration-themed spear-phishing campaign targeting U.S. local government organizations.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

This NSA summary judgment is sharply at odds with Russian President Vladimir Putin\u2019s denial<\/a> last week that Russia had interfered in foreign elections: \u201cWe never engaged in that on a state level, and have no intention of doing so.\u201d Putin, who had previously issued blanket denials that any such Russian meddling occurred, for the first time floated the possibility that freelance Russian hackers with \u201cpatriotic leanings\u201d may have been responsible. The NSA report, on the contrary, displays no doubt that the cyber assault was carried out by the GRU.<\/p>\n

The NSA analysis does not draw conclusions about whether the interference had any effect on the election\u2019s outcome and concedes that much remains unknown about the extent of the hackers\u2019 accomplishments. However, the report raises the possibility that Russian hacking may have breached at least some elements of the voting system, with disconcertingly uncertain results.<\/p>\n

The NSA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence were both contacted for this article. Officials\u00a0requested that we not publish or report on the top secret document and declined to comment on it. When informed that we intended to go ahead with this story, the NSA\u00a0requested a number of redactions. The Intercept agreed to\u00a0some of the redaction requests after determining that the disclosure of that material was\u00a0not clearly in the public interest.<\/p>\n

The report adds significant new detail to\u00a0the picture that emerged from the unclassified intelligence assessment about Russian election meddling released by the Obama administration in January.\u00a0The January assessment presented\u00a0the U.S. intelligence community\u2019s conclusions but omitted many specifics, citing concerns about disclosing sensitive sources and methods. The assessment concluded with high confidence that the Kremlin ordered an extensive, multi-pronged propaganda effort \u201cto undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency.\u201d<\/p>\n

That review\u00a0did not attempt to assess what effect the Russian efforts had on the election, despite the fact that \u201cRussian intelligence obtained and maintained access to elements of multiple US state or local electoral boards.\u201d According to the Department of Homeland Security, the assessment reported\u00a0reassuringly, \u201cthe types of systems we observed Russian actors targeting or compromising are not involved in vote tallying.\u201d<\/p>\n

The NSA has now learned, however, that Russian government hackers, part of a team with a \u201ccyber espionage mandate specifically directed at U.S. and foreign elections,\u201d focused on parts of the system directly connected to the voter registration process, including a private sector manufacturer of devices that maintain and verify the voter rolls. Some of the company\u2019s devices are advertised as having wireless internet and Bluetooth connectivity, which could have provided an ideal staging point for further malicious actions.
\n<\/a><\/p>\n

\n

\"gru-chart-russia-hacking-election-1496684832\"<\/a><\/p>\n

Attached to the secret NSA report is an overview chart detailing the Russian government\u2019s spear-phishing operation, apparently missing a second page that was not provided to The Intercept. \u00a0Graphic: NSA<\/h6>\n<\/div>\n

The Spear-Phishing Attack<\/h3>\n

As described by the classified NSA report, the Russian plan was simple: pose as an e-voting vendor and trick local government employees into opening Microsoft Word documents invisibly tainted with potent malware that could give hackers full control over the infected computers.<\/p>\n

But in order to dupe\u00a0the local officials, the hackers needed access to an election software vendor\u2019s internal systems to put together a convincing disguise. So on August 24, 2016, the Russian hackers sent spoofed emails purporting to be from Google to employees of an unnamed U.S. election software company, according to the NSA report. Although the document does not directly identify the company in question, it contains references to a product made by VR Systems, a Florida-based vendor of electronic voting services and equipment whose products are used in eight states.<\/p>\n

The spear-phishing email contained a link directing the employees to a malicious, faux-Google website that would request their login credentials and then hand them over to the hackers. The NSA identified seven \u201cpotential victims\u201d at the company. While malicious emails targeting three of the potential victims were rejected by an email server, at least one of the employee accounts was likely compromised, the agency concluded. The NSA notes in its report that it is \u201cunknown whether the aforementioned spear-phishing deployment successfully compromised all the intended victims, and what potential data from the victim could have been exfiltrated.\u201d<\/p>\n

VR Systems declined to respond to a request for comment on the specific hacking operation outlined in the NSA document. Chief Operating Officer Ben Martin replied by email to The Intercept\u2019s request for comment with the following statement:<\/p>\n

Phishing and spear-phishing are not uncommon in our industry. We regularly participate in cyber alliances with state officials and members of the law enforcement community in an effort to address these types of threats. We have policies and procedures in effect to protect our customers and our company.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Although the NSA report indicates\u00a0that VR Systems was targeted only with login-stealing trickery, rather than computer-controlling malware, this isn\u2019t necessarily a reassuring sign. Jake Williams, founder of computer security firm Rendition Infosec and formerly of the NSA\u2019s Tailored Access Operations hacking team, said stolen logins can be even more dangerous than an infected computer. \u201cI\u2019ll take credentials most days over malware,\u201d he said, since an employee\u2019s\u00a0login information can be used to penetrate \u201ccorporate VPNs, email, or cloud services,\u201d allowing access to internal corporate data. The risk is particularly heightened given how common it is to use the same password for multiple services. Phishing, as the name implies, doesn\u2019t require everyone to take the bait in order to be a success \u2014 though Williams stressed that hackers \u201cnever want just one\u201d set of stolen credentials.<\/p>\n

\n

\"nsa-russia-hacking-election-3-1496690296\"<\/a><\/p>\n

A detail from a top-secret NSA report on a Russian military intelligence operation targeting the U.S. election infrastructure. \u00a0Image: NSA<\/h6>\n<\/div>\n

In any event, the hackers apparently got what they needed. Two months later, on October 27, they set up an \u201coperational\u201d Gmail account designed to appear as if it belonged to an employee at VR Systems, and used documents\u00a0obtained from the previous operation to launch a second spear-phishing operation \u201ctargeting U.S. local government organizations.\u201d These emails contained a Microsoft Word document that had been \u201ctrojanized\u201d so that when it was opened it would send out a beacon to the \u201cmalicious infrastructure\u201d set up by the hackers.<\/p>\n

The NSA assessed that this phase of the spear-fishing operation was likely launched on either October 31 or November 1 and sent spear-fishing emails to 122 email addresses \u201cassociated with named local government organizations,\u201d probably to\u00a0officials \u201cinvolved in the management of voter registration systems.\u201d The emails contained Microsoft Word attachments purporting to be benign documentation for VR Systems\u2019 EViD voter database product line, but which were in reality maliciously embedded with automated software commands that are triggered instantly and invisibly when the user opens the document. These particular weaponized files used PowerShell, a Microsoft scripting language designed for system administrators and installed by default on Windows computers, allowing vast control over a system\u2019s settings and functions. If opened, the files \u201cvery likely\u201d would have instructed the infected computer to begin downloading in the background a second package of malware from a remote server also controlled by the hackers, which the secret report says could have provided attackers with \u201cpersistent access\u201d to the computer or\u00a0the ability to \u201csurvey the victims for items of interest.\u201d Essentially, the weaponized Word document quietly unlocks and opens a target\u2019s back\u00a0door, allowing virtually any cocktail of malware to be subsequently delivered automatically.<\/p>\n

According to Williams, if this type of attack were successful, the perpetrator would possess \u201cunlimited\u201d capacity for siphoning away items of interest. \u201cOnce the user opens up that email [attachment],\u201d Williams explained, \u201cthe attacker has all the same capabilities that the user does.\u201d Vikram Thakur, a senior research manager at Symantec\u2019s Security Response Team, told The Intercept that in cases like this the \u201cquantity of exfiltrated data is only limited by the controls put in place by network administrators.\u201d Data theft of this variety is typically encrypted, meaning anyone observing an infected network wouldn\u2019t be able to see what exactly was being removed but should certainly be able to tell something was afoot, Williams added. Overall, the method is\u00a0one of \u201cmedium sophistication,\u201d Williams said, one that \u201cpractically any hacker can pull off.\u201d<\/p>\n

The NSA, however, is uncertain about the results of the attack, according to the report. \u201cIt is unknown,\u201d the NSA notes, \u201cwhether the aforementioned spear-phishing deployment successfully compromised the intended victims, and what potential data could have been accessed by the cyber actor.\u201d<\/p>\n

The FBI would not comment about whether it is pursuing a criminal investigation into the cyber attack on VR Systems.<\/p>\n

At a December press conference, President Obama said that he told Russian President Vladimir Putin in September not to hack the U.S. election infrastructure. \u201cWhat I was concerned about in particular was making sure [the DNC hack] wasn\u2019t compounded by potential hacking that could hamper vote counting, affect the actual election process itself,\u201d Obama said. \u201cSo in early September, when I saw President Putin in China, I felt that the most effective way to ensure that that didn\u2019t happen was to talk to him directly and tell him to cut it out and there were going to be serious consequences if he didn\u2019t. And in fact we did not see further tampering of the election process.\u201d<\/p>\n

Yet the NSA has now found that the tampering continued. \u201cThe fact that this is occurring in October is troubling,\u201d said one senior law enforcement official with significant cyber expertise. \u201cIn August 2016 warnings went out from the FBI and DHS to those agencies. This was not a surprise. This was not hard to defend against. But you needed a commitment of budget and attention.\u201d<\/p>\n

The NSA document briefly describes two other election-related Russian hacking operations. In one, Russian military hackers created an email account pretending to be another U.S. election company, referred to in the document as U.S. company 2, from which they sent fake test emails offering \u201celection-related products and services.\u201d The agency was unable to determine whether there was any targeting using this account.<\/p>\n

In a third Russian operation, the same group of hackers sent test\u00a0emails to addresses at the American Samoa Election Office, presumably to determine whether those accounts existed before launching another phishing attack. It is unclear what the effort achieved, but the NSA assessed that the Russians appeared intent on \u201cmimicking a legitimate absentee ballot-related service provider.\u201d The report does not indicate why the Russians targeted the tiny Pacific islands, a U.S. territory with\u00a0no electoral votes to contribute to the election.<\/p>\n

\n

\"HOMEWORTH,<\/a><\/p>\n

A voter casts her ballot on Nov. 8, 2016 in Ohio. \u00a0Photo: Ty Wright\/Getty Images<\/h6>\n<\/div>\n

An Alluring Target<\/h3>\n

Getting attention and a budget commitment to election security requires solving a political riddle. \u201cThe problem we have is that voting security doesn\u2019t matter until something happens, and then after something happens, there\u2019s a group of people who don\u2019t want the security, because whatever happened, happened in their favor,\u201d said Bruce Schneier, a cybersecurity expert at Harvard\u2019s Berkman Center<\/a> who has written frequently about the security vulnerabilities of U.S. election systems. \u201cThat makes it a very hard security problem, unlike your bank account.\u201d<\/p>\n

Schneier said the attack, as described by the NSA, is standard hacking procedure. \u201cCredential-stealing, spear-phishing \u2014 this is how it\u2019s done,\u201d he said. \u201cOnce you get a beachhead, then you try to figure out how to go elsewhere.\u201d<\/p>\n

All of this means that it is\u00a0critical\u00a0to understand just how integral VR Systems is to our election system, and what exactly the implications of this breach are for the integrity of the result.<\/p>\n

VR Systems doesn\u2019t sell the actual touchscreen machines used to cast a vote, but rather the software and devices that verify and catalogue who\u2019s permitted to vote when they show up on Election Day or for early voting. Companies like VR are \u201cvery important\u201d because \u201ca functioning registration system is central to American elections,\u201d explained Lawrence Norden, deputy director of the Brennan Center for Justice at the NYU School of Law. Vendors like VR are also particularly sensitive, according to Norden, because local election offices \u201care often unlikely to have many or even any IT staff,\u201d meaning \u201ca vendor like this will also provide most of the IT assistance, including the work related to programming and cyber security\u201d\u2014not the kind of people you want unwittingly compromised by a hostile nation state.<\/p>\n

According to its website, VR Systems has contracts in eight\u00a0states: California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, New York, North Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia.<\/p>\n

Pamela Smith, president of election integrity watchdog Verified Voting, agreed that even if VR Systems doesn\u2019t facilitate the actual casting of votes, it could make an alluring target for anyone hoping to disrupt the vote.<\/p>\n

\u201cIf someone has access to a state voter database, they can take malicious action by modifying or removing information,\u201d she said. \u201cThis could affect whether someone has the ability to cast a regular ballot, or be required to cast a \u2018provisional\u2019 ballot \u2014 which would mean it has to be checked for their eligibility before it is included in the vote, and it may mean the voter has to jump through certain hoops such as proving their information to the election official before their eligibility is affirmed.\u201d<\/p>\n

Mark Graff, a digital security consultant and former chief cybersecurity officer at Lawrence Livermore National Lab, described such a hypothetical tactic as \u201ceffectively a denial of service attack\u201d against would-be voters. But a more worrying prospect, according to Graff, is that hackers would target a company like VR Systems to get closer to the actual tabulation of the vote. An attempt to directly break into or alter the actual voting machines would be more conspicuous and considerably riskier than compromising an adjacent, less visible part of the voting system, like voter registration databases, in the hope\u00a0that one is networked to the other. Sure enough, VR Systems advertises the fact that its EViD computer polling station equipment line is\u00a0connected to the internet, and that on Election Day \u201ca voter\u2019s voting history is transmitted immediately to the county database\u201d on a continuous basis. A computer attack can thus spread quickly and invisibly through networked components of a system like germs through a handshake.<\/p>\n

According to Alex Halderman, director of the University of Michigan Center for Computer Security and Society and an electronic voting expert, one of the main concerns in the scenario described by the NSA document is the likelihood that the officials setting up the electronic poll books are the same people doing the pre-programming of the voting machines. The actual voting machines aren\u2019t going to be networked to something like VR Systems\u2019 EViD, but they do receive manual updates and configuration from people at the local or state level who could be responsible for both. If those were the people targeted by the GRU malware, the implications are troubling.<\/p>\n

\u201cUsually at the county level there\u2019s going to be some company that does the pre-election programming of the voting machines,\u201d Halderman told The Intercept. \u201cI would worry about whether an attacker who could compromise the poll book vendor might be able to use software updates that the vendor distributes to also infect the election management system that programs the voting machines themselves,\u201d he added. \u201cOnce you do that, you can cause the voting machine to create fraudulent counts.\u201d<\/p>\n

According to\u00a0Schneier, a major prize in breaching VR Systems would be\u00a0the ability to gather enough information to effectively execute spoof attacks against election officials themselves. Coming with the imprimatur of the election board\u2019s main contractor, a fake email looks that much more authentic.<\/p>\n

\n

\"nsa-russia-hacking-election-4-1496690298\"<\/a><\/p>\n

A detail from a top-secret NSA report on a Russian military intelligence operation targeting the U.S. election infrastructure. \u00a0Image: NSA<\/h6>\n<\/div>\n

Such a breach could also serve as its own base from which to launch disruptions. One U.S. intelligence official conceded that the Russian operation outlined by the NSA \u2014 targeting voter registration software \u2014 could potentially have disrupted voting in the locations where VR Systems\u2019 products were being used. And a compromised election poll book system can do more than cause chaos on Election Day, said Halderman. \u201cYou could even do that preferentially in areas for voters that are likely to vote for a certain candidate and thereby have a partisan effect.\u201d<\/p>\n

Using this method to target a U.S. presidential election, the Russian approach faces a challenge in the\u00a0decentralized federal election system, where processes\u00a0differ not merely state to\u00a0state but often county to county. \u00a0And meanwhile, the Electoral College makes it difficult to predict where efforts should be concentrated.<\/p>\n

\u201cHacking an election is hard, not because of technology \u2014 that\u2019s surprisingly easy \u2014 but it\u2019s hard to know what\u2019s going to be effective,\u201d said Schneier. \u201cIf you look at the last few elections, 2000 was decided in Florida, 2004 in Ohio, the most recent election in a couple counties in Michigan and Pennsylvania, so deciding exactly where to hack is really hard to know.\u201d<\/p>\n

But the system\u2019s decentralization is also a vulnerability. There is no\u00a0strong central government oversight of the election process or the acquisition of voting hardware or software. Likewise, voter registration, maintenance of voter rolls, and vote counting lack any effective national\u00a0oversight.\u00a0There is no\u00a0single authority with the responsibility for safeguarding elections. Christian Hilland, a spokesperson for the FEC, told The Intercept that \u201cthe Federal Election Commission does not have jurisdiction over voting matters as well as software and hardware in connection with casting votes. You may want to check with the Election Assistance Commission.\u201d<\/p>\n

Checking with the EAC is also less than confidence inspiring. The commission was created in 2002 as the congressional reaction to the vote-counting debacle of 2000. The EAC notes online that it \u201cis charged with serving as a national clearinghouse <\/a>of information on election administration. EAC also accredits testing laboratories and certifies voting systems<\/a>,\u201d but it is a backwater commission with no real authority. Click on the link about certifying voting systems and it leads you to a dead page.<\/p>\n

If there were a central U.S. election authority, it might have launched an investigation into what happened in Durham, North Carolina, on Election Day. The registration system malfunctioned at a number of polling locations, causing chaos and long lines, which triggered election officials to switch to paper ballots and extend voting later into the evening.<\/p>\n

Durham\u2019s voter rolls were run by VR Systems \u2014 the same firm that was compromised by the Russian hack, according to the NSA document.<\/p>\n

Local officials said that a hack was not the cause of the disruption. \u201cThe N.C. State Board of Elections did not experience any suspicious activity during the 2016 election outside of what this agency experiences at other times. Any potential risks or vulnerabilities are being monitored, and this agency works with the Department of Homeland Security and the N.C. Department of Information Technology to help mitigate any potential risks,\u201d said Patrick Gannon, a spokesperson for the North Carolina board of elections.<\/p>\n

George McCue, deputy director of the Durham County board of elections, also said that VR Systems\u2019 software was not the issue. \u201cThere was some investigation there, essentially no evidence came out of it indicating there was any problem with the product,\u201d he said. \u201cIt appears to be user errors at different points in the process, between the setup of the computers and the poll workers using them.\u201d<\/p>\n

All of this\u00a0taken together ratchets up the stakes of the ongoing investigations into collusion between the Trump campaign and Russian operatives, which promises to soak up more national attention this week as fired FBI Director James Comey appears before Congress to testify. If collusion can ultimately be demonstrated \u2014 a big if at this point \u2014 then the assistance on Russia\u2019s part went beyond allegedly hacking email to serve a propaganda campaign, and bled into an attack on U.S. election infrastructure itself.<\/p>\n

Whatever the investigation into the Trump campaign concludes, however, it pales in comparison to the threat posed to the legitimacy of U.S. elections if the infrastructure itself can\u2019t be secured. The NSA conclusion \u201cdemonstrates that countries are looking at specific tactics for election manipulation, and we need to be vigilant in defense,\u201d said Schneier. \u201cElections do two things: one choose the winner, and two, they convince the loser. To the extent the elections are vulnerable to hacking, we risk the legitimacy of the voting process, even if there is no actual hacking at the time.\u201d<\/p>\n

Throughout history, the transfer of power has been the moment of greatest weakness for societies, leading to untold bloodshed. The peaceful transfer of power is one of the greatest innovations of democracy.<\/p>\n

\u201cIt\u2019s not just that [an election] has to be fair, it has to be demonstrably fair, so that the loser says, \u2018Yep, I lost fair and square.\u2019 If you can\u2019t do that, you\u2019re screwed,\u201d said Schneier. \u201cThey\u2019ll tear themselves apart if they\u2019re convinced it\u2019s not accurate.\u201d<\/p>\n

___
\nhttp:\/\/theintercept.com\/2017\/06\/05\/top-secret-nsa-report-details-russian-hacking-effort-days-before-2016-election\/<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

___
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