\n
Page 6<\/p>\n
. . .<\/p>\n
RECOMMENDATIONS<\/p>\n
8. It is recommended that:<\/p>\n
a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be
\nforwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and
\ntransmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.<\/p>\n
b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified
\nor specified commands.<\/p>\n
c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned
\nto NATO activities.<\/p>\n
d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US
\nDelegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.
\n. . .<\/p>\n
Page 8<\/p>\n
APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A<\/p>\n
DRAFT<\/p>\n
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE<\/p>\n
Subject: Justification for U.S. Military Intervention
\nin Cuba (TS)<\/p>\n
1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations,
\nCuba project, for General Craig, subject: “Operation MONGOOSE”,
\ndated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise
\ndescription of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff
\nconsider would provide justifications for US military inter-
\nvention in Cuba.<\/p>\n
2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded
\nas a prelimiary submission suitable for planning purposes.
\nIt is assumed that there will be similar submissions from
\nother agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis
\nfor developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects
\ncan then be considered on a case-by-case basis.<\/p>\n
3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the
\nattached suggestions, or from other sources, should be
\ndeveloped to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate
\nobjective which would provide adequate justification for
\nUS military intervention. Such a plan would enable a logical
\nbuild-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly
\nunrelated events to camoflage the ultimate objective and
\ncreate the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and
\nirresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other
\ncountries as well as the United States. The plan would also
\nproperly integrate and time phase the courses of action to
\nbe pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of
\nthis plan would be to place the United States in the apparent
\nposition of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and
\nirresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an inter-
\nnational image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western
\nHemisphere.
\nAppendix to
\nEnclosure A
\n5
\n. . .<\/p>\n
Page 9<\/p>\n
4. Time is an important factor in resolution of the Cuban
\nproblem. Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that
\nprojects would be operable within the next few months.<\/p>\n
5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military
\nintervention, it is recommended that primary responsibility
\nfor developing military and para-military aspects of the plan
\nfor both overt and covert military operations be assigned the
\nJoint Chiefs of Staff.<\/p>\n
Appendix to
\nEnclosure A
\n6
\n. . .<\/p>\n
Page 10<\/p>\n
ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A<\/p>\n
PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA<\/p>\n
(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary
\nsubmission suitable only for planning purposes. They are
\narranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order.
\nTogether with similar inputs from other agencies, they are
\nintended to provide a point of departure for the development
\nof a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would
\npermit the evaluation of individual projects within the context
\nof cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably
\nto the objective of adequate justification for US military
\nintervention in Cuba).<\/p>\n
1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate
\nprovocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba
\na cover and deception plan. to include requisite preliminary
\nactions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c,
\ncould be executed as an initial effort to provode Cuban
\nreactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the
\nCubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military
\nposture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid
\nchange from exercise to intervention if Cuban responses justifies.<\/p>\n
2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned
\nto take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine
\nappearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.<\/p>\n
a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in
\nchronilogical order):<\/p>\n
(1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.<\/p>\n
(2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform “over-the-fence”
\nto stage attack on the base.<\/p>\n
(3) Capture Cuban (friendly) sabateurs inside the
\nbase.<\/p>\n
(4) Start riots near the entrance to the base (friendly
\nCubans).
\nAppendix to
\nEnclosure A
\n7
\n. . .<\/p>\n
Page 11<\/p>\n
(5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.<\/p>\n
(6) Burn aircraft on airbase (sabatage).<\/p>\n
(7) Lob morter shells from outside of base into base.
\nSome damage to installations.<\/p>\n
(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea
\nof vicinity of Guantanamo City.<\/p>\n
(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.<\/p>\n
(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires — napthalene.<\/p>\n
(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals
\nfor mock-victims (may be lieu of (10)).<\/p>\n
b. United States would respond by executing offensive
\noperations to secure water and power supplies, destroying
\nartillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.<\/p>\n
c. Commence large scale United States military operations.<\/p>\n
3. A “Remember the Maine” incident could be arranged in
\nseveral forms:<\/p>\n
a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and
\nblame Cuba.<\/p>\n
b. We could blow up a drone (unmannded) vessel anywhere
\nin the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident
\nin the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result
\nof Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presense
\nof Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of
\nthe vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship
\nwas taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago
\nwould add credibility especially to those people that might
\nhave heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could
\nfollow with an air\/sea rescue operation covered by US
\nfighters to “evacuate” remaining members of the non-existant
\ncrew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful
\nwave of national indignation.<\/p>\n
4. We could develop a Communist Cuba terror campaign in
\nthe Miami area, in other Flordia cities and even in Washington.
\nAppendix to
\nEnclosure A
\n8
\n. . .<\/p>\n
Page 12<\/p>\n
The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking
\nhaven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans
\nenroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts
\non lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the
\nextent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized.
\nExploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the
\narrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents
\nsubstantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in
\nprojecting the idea of an irresponsible government.<\/p>\n
5. A “Cuban-based, Castro-supported” filibuster could be
\nsimulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein
\nof the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We
\nknow that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely
\nagainst Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at
\npresent and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and
\nadditional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage
\ncan be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to
\nintrusions within their national air space. “Cuban” B-26 or
\nC-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night.
\nSoviet Bloc incidiaries could be found. This could be coupled
\nwith “Cuban” messages to the Communist underground in the
\nDominican Republic and “Cuban” shipments of arms which would
\nbe found, or intercepted, on the beach.<\/p>\n
6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide
\nadditional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on
\nsurface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft
\nby MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions.
\nAn F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they
\nsaw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were
\nto announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion
\nappears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modify-
\ning an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could
\nbe purchased from US resources in about three months.
\nAppendix to
\nEnclosure A
\n9
\n. . .<\/p>\n
Page 13<\/p>\n
7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft
\nshould appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the
\ngovernment of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban
\ncivil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.<\/p>\n
8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate
\nconvincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down
\na chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to
\nJamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would
\nbe chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba.
\nThe passengers could be a group of college students off on a
\nholiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to
\nsupport chartering a non-scheduled flight.<\/p>\n
a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and
\nnumbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered
\naircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the
\nMiami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be
\nsubsituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be
\nloaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under
\ncarefully prepared aliases. The actual registered
\naircraft would be converted to a drone.<\/p>\n
b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual
\naircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of
\nFlorida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying
\naircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly
\ninto an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will
\nhave been made to evacuate the passengers and return the
\naircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft
\nmeanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When
\nover Cuba the drone will being transmitting on the inter-
\nnational distress frequency a “MAY DAY” message stating he
\nis under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission
\nwill be interrupted by the destruction of aircraft which will
\nbe triggered by radio signal. This will allow IACO radio
\nAppendix to
\nEnclosure A
\n10
\n. . .<\/p>\n
Page 14<\/p>\n
stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what
\nhas happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to
\n“sell” the incident.<\/p>\n
9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it
\nappear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft
\nover international waters in an unprovoked attack.<\/p>\n
a. Approximately 4 of 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched
\nin trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba.
\nTheir mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir
\naircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida.
\nThese aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at
\nfrequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at
\nleast 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be
\nrequired to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile
\nactions were taken by the Cuban MIGs.<\/p>\n
b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly
\ntail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft.
\nWhile near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that
\nhe had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other
\ncalls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly
\nwest at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an
\nEglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper
\npeople, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The
\npilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would
\nresume his proper identity and return to his normal place
\nof business. The pilot and aircraft would then have
\ndisappeared.<\/p>\n
c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was
\npresumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft
\nwould disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately
\n15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots
\nretuning to Homestead would have a true story as far as
\nthey knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched
\nand parts of aircraft found.
\nAppendix to
\nEnclosure A
\n11
\n. . .<\/p>\n
Page 15<\/p>\n
ENCLOSURE B<\/p>\n
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM<\/p>\n
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated*
\nthat US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be
\nundertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile
\nacts against US forces or property which would serve as an
\nincident upon which to base overt intervention.<\/p>\n
2. The need for positive action in the event that current
\ncovert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are
\nunsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
\non 7 March 1962, as follows:<\/p>\n
” – – – determination that a credible internal
\nrevolt is impossible of attainment during the next
\n9-10 months will require a decision by the United States
\nto develop a Cuban “provocation” as justification for
\npositive US military action.”<\/p>\n
3. It is understood that the Department of State also is
\npreparing suggested courses of action to develop justification
\nfor US military intervention in Cuba.<\/p>\n
_____________
\n* (JCS 1969\/303)
\n** (JCS 1969\/313)<\/p>\n
The above excerpts are taken from the original 15-page US Government TOP SECRET document, “Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba [including cover memoranda], March 13, 1962,” available at the National Security Archive<\/a> website in pdf format at the following link: http:\/\/www.gwu.edu\/~nsarchiv\/news\/20010430\/doc1.pdf<\/a> <\/span>(if you don’t have it, download Adobe Acrobat Reader<\/a> to view pdf formatted files). The introductory text entry point for this document is at Pentagon Proposed Pretexts for Cuba Invasion in 1962<\/a>(http:\/\/www.gwu.edu\/~nsarchiv\/news\/20010430\/<\/a>).<\/span><\/p>\n___
\nhttp:\/\/www.ratical.org\/ratville\/CAH\/Northwoods.html<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-35932","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation2012.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/35932","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation2012.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation2012.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation2012.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation2012.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=35932"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation2012.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/35932\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation2012.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=35932"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation2012.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=35932"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation2012.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=35932"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}