{"id":118312,"date":"2019-03-10T08:14:46","date_gmt":"2019-03-10T12:14:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/stateofthenation2012.com\/?p=118312"},"modified":"2019-03-10T08:14:52","modified_gmt":"2019-03-10T12:14:52","slug":"governments-bird-flu-research-so-dangerous-it-could-trigger-a-mass-death-pandemic","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/stateofthenation2012.com\/?p=118312","title":{"rendered":"Government’s Bird Flu Research So Dangerous It Could Trigger a ‘Mass Death’ Pandemic"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

Our Own Government Is Quietly Funding Bird Flu Research That Could End Up Killing Us All<\/h1>\n

By Dagny Taggart<\/p>\n

Back in 2014, due to safety concerns, the government suspended dangerous research that could make the bird flu virus more easily transmitted to humans.<\/p>\n

It was a wise decision, but unfortunately, short-lived.<\/p>\n

In February,\u00a0Science Magazine<\/a>\u00a0revealed a troubling discovery: Last year, a U.S. government review panel decided to let the research resume. They\u00a0actually want<\/em>scientists to figure out how to make the avian flu more likely to kill us all and what\u2019s more, they\u2019re not telling us why.<\/p>\n

Do they want a pandemic? Because this is how you get a pandemic. Anyone who\u2019s read a book like\u00a0The Stand<\/a><\/em>\u00a0knows this is how you get a pandemic.<\/p>\n

Not only did the government approve the experiments, but they are also\u00a0paying for them.<\/em><\/h2>\n

Here are additional details from\u00a0The New York Times<\/a>:<\/p>\n

Two research teams, in Wisconsin and the Netherlands, have been told by the Department of Health and Human Services that their work is eligible for research funding from the United States government. The Wisconsin group was notified in October, and the Dutch group in January, a spokeswoman for H.H.S. said in an email.<\/p>\n

Despite requests from The New York Times on Thursday and Friday, officials from H.H.S. did not explain why they had not announced their decisions on the two labs at the time they were made.<\/p>\n

Spokeswomen for H.H.S. and the National Institutes of Health said the decision to lift the moratorium had\u00a0already been announced in December 2017<\/a>\u00a0when N.I.H. disclosed that the studies would be allowed,\u00a0but only after newly created expert panels judged<\/a>\u00a0each proposal to be safe and scientifically sound. (source<\/a>)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Many scientists are outraged.<\/h2>\n

The lack of information about the decision and how it was reached have provoked outrage from many scientists.<\/p>\n

They oppose the research because they say it could create mutant viruses that might cause deadly pandemics if they were unleashed by lab accidents or terrorism.<\/p>\n

The experiments, which were conducted by teams led by Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin in Madison and the University of Tokyo and Ron Fouchier at Erasmus University Medical Center in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, sparked worldwide fears when they were first revealed in 2011.<\/p>\n

Here\u2019s a bit of history on the controversial experiments, from\u00a0Science Magazine\u2019s report<\/a>:<\/p>\n

In 2011, Fouchier and Kawaoka alarmed the world by revealing they had separately\u00a0modified the deadly avian H5N1 influenza virus so that it spread between ferrets<\/a>. Advocates of such gain of function (GOF) studies say they can help public health experts better understand how viruses might spread and plan for pandemics. But by enabling the bird virus to more easily spread among mammals, the experiments also raised fears that the pathogen could jump to humans. And critics of the work worried that such a souped-up virus could spark a pandemic if it escaped from a lab or was intentionally released by a bioterrorist. After extensive discussion about whether the two studies should even be published (they ultimately were)\u00a0and a voluntary moratorium by the two labs, the experiments resumed in 2013 under new U.S. oversight rules.<\/p>\n

But concerns reignited after more papers and a series of accidents at federal biocontainment labs. In October 2014, U.S. officials\u00a0announced an unprecedented \u201cpause<\/a>\u201d<\/a>\u00a0on funding<\/a>\u00a0for 18 GOF studies involving influenza or the Middle East respiratory syndrome or severe acute respiratory syndrome viruses. (About half were later allowed to continue because the work didn\u2019t fit the definition or was deemed essential to public health.) (source<\/a>)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In case you are wondering what \u201cgain of function\u201d studies are (as I was), here\u2019s an explanation from a 2014 statement from the\u00a0National Institutes of Health<\/a>:<\/p>\n

For purposes of the deliberative process and this funding pause, \u201cGOF studies\u201d refers to scientific research that increases the ability of any of these infectious agents to cause disease by enhancing its pathogenicity or by increasing its transmissibility among mammals by respiratory droplets. (source<\/a>)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

That\u00a0statement<\/a>, which was published on October 16, 2014, concluded with this:<\/p>\n

Public involvement in this deliberative process is key, and the process is thus designed to be transparent, accessible, and open to input from all sources. Consultation with the NSABB, the first step in this process, will take place October 22, and I encourage you to follow these deliberations closely. (source<\/a>)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

That transparency didn\u2019t happen, and some scientists are upset because the government\u2019s review will not be made public.<\/p>\n

The lack of openness is \u201cindefensible\u201d<\/h2>\n

Harvard University epidemiologist Marc Lipsitch is one of the scientists who is not happy with the government\u2019s decision,\u00a0 \u201cAfter a deliberative process that cost $1 million for [a consultant\u2019s] external study and consumed countless weeks and months of time for many scientists, we are now being asked to trust a completely opaque process where the outcome is to permit the continuation of dangerous experiments,\u201c he told\u00a0Science Magazine<\/a>.<\/p>\n

An HHS spokesperson told\u00a0Science Magazine<\/a>\u00a0that the government cannot make the panel\u2019s reviews public because they contain proprietary and grant competition information.<\/p>\n

Isn\u2019t it comforting to know the government is more concerned about protecting trade secrets than it is about protecting the public?<\/p>\n

The government only confirmed its decision after\u00a0Science Magazine<\/a>\u00a0learned of it and publicized the information.<\/p>\n

Critics say the HHS panel should at least publicly explain why it thought the same questions could not be answered using safer alternative methods.<\/p>\n

\u201cDetails regarding the decision to approve and fund this work should be made transparent,\u201d\u00a0said<\/a>\u00a0Thomas Inglesby, director of Center for Health Security of the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health in Baltimore, Maryland.<\/p>\n

The lack of openness \u201cis disturbing. And indefensible,\u201d said Richard H. Ebright, a molecular biologist at Rutgers.<\/p>\n

This virus poses an extremely significant threat to humans.<\/h2>\n

Back in 2012, Ebright told\u00a0Scientific American<\/a>\u00a0that the deadly virus could pose a significant threat to humans:<\/p>\n

\u201cThe primary risks are accidental release through\u00a0accidental infection of a lab worker who then infects others \u2014 for which there are many precedents \u2014 and deliberate release by a disturbed or disgruntled lab worker, for which the 2001 US anthrax mailings provide a precedent. Bioterrorism and biowarfare also are risks.\u201d (source<\/a>)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

And if you\u2019re wondering how likely a lab accident is, here\u2019s an article called\u00a0A brief, terrifying history of viruses escaping from labs<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Lipsitch and Ingelsby outlined their concerns in an opinion piece for The Washington Post titled\u00a0The U.S. is funding dangerous experiments it doesn\u2019t want you to know about<\/a>. Here are a few excerpts from that article.<\/p>\n

\n

Amazingly, despite the potential public-health consequences of such work, neither the approval nor the deliberations or judgments that supported it were announced publicly. The government confirmed them only when a reporter learned about them through non-official channels.<\/p>\n

This lack of transparency is unacceptable. Making decisions to approve potentially dangerous research in secret betrays the government\u2019s responsibility to inform and involve the public when approving endeavors, whether scientific or otherwise, that could put health and lives at risk.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

No description of who reviewed these proposals has been provided. It is not stated what evidence was considered, how competing claims were evaluated or whether there were potential conflicts of interest.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

But creating potentially pandemic pathogens\u00a0creates a risk<\/a>\u00a0\u2014 albeit a small one \u2014 of infecting millions of people with a highly dangerous virus. For this kind of research, there is no justification for keeping risk-benefit deliberations secret. (source<\/a>)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

They\u2019re trying to turn the bird flu into the human flu.<\/h2>\n

In an article for Forbes titled\u00a0Scientists Resume Efforts To Create Deadly Flu Virus, With US Government\u2019s Blessing<\/a>, scientist and professor Steven Salzberg expressed concern over the decision to resume the research. He doesn\u2019t hold back, beginning his piece with this statement:<\/p>\n

For more than a decade now, two scientists\u2013one in the U.S. and one in the Netherlands\u2013have been trying to create a deadly human pathogen from avian influenza<\/a>. That\u2019s right: they are trying to turn \u201cbird flu,\u201d which does not normally infect people, into a human flu. (source<\/a>)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Salzberg continues:<\/p>\n

For those who might not know, the 1918 influenza pandemic, which\u00a0killed between 50 and 100 million people worldwide<\/a>\u00a0(3% of the entire world population at the time), was caused by a strain of avian influenza that made the jump into humans. The 1918 flu was so deadly that it \u201ckilled more American soldiers and sailors during World War I than did enemy weapons<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

Not surprisingly, then, when other scientists (including me) learned about the efforts to turn bird flu into a human flu, we asked: why the heck would anyone do that? The answers were and still are unsatisfactory: claims such as \u201cwe\u2019ll learn more about the pandemic potential of the flu\u201d and \u201cwe\u2019ll be better prepared for an avian flu pandemic if one occurs.\u201d These are hand-waving arguments that may sound reasonable, but they promise only vague benefits while ignoring the dangers of this research. If the research succeeds, and one of the newly-designed, highly virulent flu strains escapes, the damage could be horrific. (source<\/a>)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Perhaps the most chilling statement from Salzberg is this:<\/p>\n

This research has the potential to cause millions of deaths.<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Way back in 2013, Lizzie Bennett warned about the risks of these experiments in the article\u00a0Creating a Monster: Will Bird Flu Research Result in a Deadly Pandemic?<\/a>:<\/p>\n

Should H5N1 mutate sufficiently to move from a disease caught by those working in live bird markets, or those living and working with poultry in their immediate area, to a disease able to pass easily from human to human a pandemic is not just possible but extremely likely.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

At the end of\u00a0that piece<\/a>, Bennett asked two important questions:<\/p>\n

The fact is that bird flu will eventually mutate, the question is will science bring this down on us earlier than it would have happened naturally? Or will science save us by finding out how to stop the disease in its tracks?<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

\u201cWe are glad the United States government weighed the risks and benefits \u2026 and developed new oversight mechanisms. We know that it does carry risks. We also believe it is important work to protect human health,\u201d\u00a0Kawaoka said<\/a>\u00a0of being able to return to his research.<\/p>\n

Exactly how dangerous\u00a0is<\/em>\u00a0this research?<\/h2>\n

Here\u2019s a quote that will give you a general idea of how dangerous this research is. Rebecca L. Moritz, a microbiologist specializing in biosafety and biosecurity, is involved with the bird flu research at the University of Wisconsin.<\/p>\n

Ms. Moritz said local fire departments were directed not to enter the virus lab for any reason and if there was a fire, to\u00a0let it burn<\/strong>. If someone working in the virus lab has a medical crisis, \u201cfirst-responders are not able to reach them until they have been decontaminated by qualified lab staff,\u201d she said. (source<\/a>)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Let it burn.<\/p>\n

Now imagine if scientists could figure out how to make this transmissible between humans.<\/p>\n

Why is the government being so secretive about these experiments?<\/h2>\n

Call me crazy, but I can\u2019t help but suspect the government has undisclosed reasons for allowing this research to continue. I doubt it is to create stockpiles of vaccines because science can\u2019t even do that for season flu viruses \u2013 they mutate too fast.<\/p>\n

Could it be that this research is being conducted to create a bioterrorism weapon? Or, is it possible that another country (perhaps China or Russia) is working on this as well, and the U.S. is trying to beat them to it?<\/p>\n

Is there a possible threat we aren\u2019t being told about? Perhaps it is past time to start\u00a0preparing for a pandemic<\/a>, because natural or man-made, it is likely coming.<\/p>\n

___
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